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In this bicentennial year, volumes 
seem to have been written about all 
aspects of life in colonial America 
except one—its accounting. The 
reason may be that no new develop-
ments in the art of accounting took 
place in America 200 years ago to 
interest historians. 
But the fact is that even if colonial 
America had little influence on 
accounting, accounting was an 
important factor in the life of the 
eighteenth century. Fortunately, the 
account books of colonial American 
businessmen, ranging from its rich 
and powerful citizens to obscure 
country merchants, still exist and 
provide a clear insight into the 
commerce and life styles of the 
period. 
The accounts of Ben Franklin's 
print shop—and the audit done 
prior to its sale by the first recorded 
American "public accountant"— 
have been preserved. The 
meticulous and voluminous 
accounts of George Washington's 
expenses, not only as commander-
in-chief of the Continental Army but 
also as a leading planter, land 
speculator, and businessman, reveal 
new insights about the "father of 
our country." 
As an impoverished American 
government conducted an 
expensive war against the leading 
superpower of the eighteenth 
century, accounting records show 
behind-the-scenes problems never 
mentioned in chronicles of battles 
and troop movements. One of the 
great leaders of the Revolution was 
Robert Morris, a Philadelphia 
merchant and financier who never 
fought in a battle but who handled 
the accounts that financed the 
rations, uniforms, and weapons of 
victory. 
O n the technical side, colonial 
accounting bore many similarities to 
modern accounting, but more 
interesting are the differences. The 
two best-known and most widely 
used accounting documents today 
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are the balance sheet and income 
statement. Neither of these forms 
existed in colonial America or 
anywhere else in the eighteenth 
century. 
Essentially, the corporation as a 
business form did not exist under 
British rule between 1719 and 1825— 
a result of the "Bubble Act" passed 
by the parliament requiring personal 
approval by the king of any such 
venture. Owning a colonial business 
required either an independent 
entrepreneur or a partnership. Thus 
the public reporting of modern 
corporations was totally unknown. 
Nor were taxes levied on sales or 
earnings of businesses, which meant 
today's reporting requirements to 
the government were also 
unknown. As a result, the books that 
were kept in colonial America 
existed solely to aid the owner in 
the conduct of his business. 
The three principal books kept by 
colonial businessmen were the 
waste book, the journal, and the 
ledger. Original entries were placed 
roughly but in detail in the waste 
book by the merchant's servant, 
wife, or whoever made the 
transaction. These entries were then 
repeated in the journal, separating 
the debits from the credits. This was 
written in the "fine hand" of the 
merchant. Finally, journal entries 
were written up in individual 
accounts in the ledger. As debts 
were paid, they were lightly crossed 
out in the ledger, and the date of 
payment was added. 
Subsidiary books were also kept 
to record cash transactions, 
expenditures, hours worked, and 
other accounts appropriate to a 
particular business. These books 
were posted directly to the ledger. 
No "generally accepted accounting 
principles" existed. Since the 
books were kept solely for the 
convenience of the owner/manager, 
they were unaudited. 
Periodicity did not exist. The most 
common reasons for balancing an 
account were the completion of a 
ledger book, death of the merchant, 
or sale of the business. Errors were 
commonplace and seldom 
were corrected. 
The essence of business 200 years 
ago was barter and credit, according 
to account books of the time. Barter 
was used because of a shortage of 
money in the colonies. By British 
regulation, no coins could be 
minted in America, and by policy 
the balance of trade was always in 
favor of England, causing an outflow 
of whatever money there was. 
Barter was convenient in small 
rural communities where people's 
needs complemented one another. 
But it was also appropriate for the 
large cities, since merchants could 
know their customers in a colonial 
Philadelphia which had but 40,000 
residents, or a New York, which had 
20,000. 
Barter did not usually take the 
form of simultaneous swapping. 
Instead, it was "bookkeeping 
barter," where the first half of a 
transaction created a debit on the 
books of the recipient and a credit 
on the books of the giver, it would 
be paid later by receiving goods 
directly, since the accounts were a 
jumble of goods and services on 
both sides. Small farmers and 
tradesmen, whose modern-day 
counterparts have no knowledge of 
accounting, thus needed to have 
some inkling of double-entry 
bookkeeping in order to participate 
in the colonial business system. 
Naturally, this bookkeeping barter 
facilitated credit transfers between 
individuals, so that notes payable to 
order became a private type of 
paper money. 
In addition to such private paper 
money, a mass of public paper 
money was issued by each state as 
well as under federal auspices. This 
money was printed originally 
because of the shortage of specie, or 
hard money, but its supply increased 
rapidly when it became necessary to 
finance a major war. This currency 
was "soft" in that it was not backed 
by precious metal. The term "not 
worth a Continental" resulted from 
the inflation and consequent 
depreciation of the value of this 
currency. 
Despite the inflation, the income 
of the federal government for the 
war year 1781 came to a little over $1 
million, according to a 1795 report 
of the Continental Congress. 
The following shows receipts and 
disbursements: 
RECEIPTS 
Bills of exchange sold . . . $ 294,165 
Specie from France 462,597 
Paper money negotiations 62,001 
Yorktown booty 71,439 






Salaries and expenses 
of civil officers % 15,302 
Marine 87,608 
Paymaster 140,965 
Military and ordnance 
stores 39,573 
Quartermaster general . . . 110,330 
Army subsistence 114,997 
Army clothing 60,560 
Medical department 10,090 
Payment of old accounts. 115,196 
Miscellaneous 28,838 
Total $ 723,459 
Surplus $ 306,620 
The surplus shown is doubtless 
not a real picture of the financial 
state of the US Treasury at the time; 
one source suggests the surplus was 
"created" to enhance the 
possibilities of further borrowing 
from Europe. From most accounts, 
the government was operating far in 
the red—up to $20 million in 
expenses—while running the 
printing presses to try to stay even. 
The galloping inflation created by 
this "soft" Continental currency was 
seized by the British as a weapon of 
war, since a defeat of American 
finances would have ended the 
revolution. England printed and 
circulated large quantities of 
counterfeit US currency to further 
erode its purchasing power. But 
these efforts were partially offset by 
infusions of specie from America's 
20 
allies—France, Spain, and Holland. 
One interesting problem faced by 
the financial records of the time is 
the intermixing of this Continental 
"soft" currency with the hard specie 
loaned by France. Considering that 
at one point in 1780 a dollar in silver 
equaled as much as $500 in Conti-
nental currency, the inadequacy of 
colonial accounting being able to 
cope with such a situation is 
apparent. 
Investments in privateering or a 
rum-running voyage helped to 
make venture accounting the rule 
of the day for revolutionary 
businessmen. The privateer would 
capture a British ship and share its 
bounty with the government. Each 
individual venture had different 
partners who invested their money 
to equip and launch a warship. 
Account books of these ventures 
exist, showing the costs of outfitting 
a cruiser in hopes of capturing, say, 
a rich English merchantman 
returning from India. These 
endeavors were called patriotic 
piracy by many, although it would 
appear in some cases that the piracy 
aspect was paramount. The British 
navy referred to Captain John Paul 
Jones as a pirate and would have 
hanged him if they had caught him. 
Periodic results were unimportant 
in such ventures, since the 
partnership was dissolved after the 
voyage, and the assets which 
remained were divided and shared 
by the participants. 
Since there were no American 
stock companies, partnerships were 
sometimes spread rather thin. The 
broadest on record is 1/96 of a 
trading voyage. Risks were high on 
such ventures, but rewards were 
often good. A partnership, Jack and 
Bromfield of Newburyport, Mass., 
cleared £7,591 profit on the slender 
trading capital of £1,600 between 
1766 and 1774. 
The accounting and finances of 
the Continental army in 1776 caused 
major problems that grew steadily 
worse as the war wore on. At times 
they frequently caused more 
headaches than did the "redcoats," 
The underlying difficulty was that a 
small fledgling government, lacking 
the full support of its populace, 
could not afford to staff, arm, 
clothe, and feed a large standing 
army. The Continental Congress 
simply had no luck in taxing citizens 
to pay for the war. The situation was 
aggravated, moreover, by the 
inclination of many of the people 
who supplied these needs to be 
motivated solely by profit rather 
than by patriotic motives. 
The difficulty of keeping 
accounting records may be sug-
gested by the following: 
Compiling a company roster in 
the Continental Army was 
compounded by its recruiting 
methods. The army was staffed in 
part by means of paying bounties, or 
bonuses, for enlistment. This created 
a class of individuals who would 
enlist, desert, and enlist again in 
order to collect a number of 
bonuses. (It was also difficult to 
keep track of an army, whose men 
would leave for home to tend to 
their plowing or planting.) 
Arms were as difficult to inventory 
as to obtain. They usually consisted 
of whatever the volunteers could 
bring with them, supplemented by 
some French muskets. It was not 
uncommon for 20 per cent of the 
Continental soldiers entering a 
battle to have no firearms. They 
would pick them up from fallen 
comrades, or from the enemy. 
Uniforms for the common soldiers 
required no records at first, since 
they did not exist. Nor were they 
ever in reasonable supply, as they 
progressed from the rags at Valley 
Forge, where men could not drill 
because they had no clothes to 
wear, to a large shipload of uniforms 
that arrived from Europe a year after 
the war ended. 
Food for colonial troops ranged 
from insufficient to non-existent, 
due to a general shortage and high 
prices. These problems were caused 
by such factors as farmers having to 
serve in the army, sales by American 
farmers to the English army for gold, 
sales abroad to raise money, lack of 
patriotism by some loyalist farmers, 
and a distribution system that was 
highly inefficient and included some 
corrupt commissary officers. The 
latter facts are perhaps shown by the 
saying at Valley Forge that wood for 
huts and fires was the only supply 
that was plentiful, because it was the 
one not involving the commissary or 
quartermaster corps. 
The commissary general's 
department was created by a 
Congressional bill of 41 sections and 
6,000 words. It covered duplicate 
invoices, receipts, issuance slips, 
ten-column ledgers, and so on. The 
accounting system created a series 
of cross-checks on commissaries of 
21 
forage, commissaries of purchase, 
issuing commissaries, keepers of 
stores warehouses, line officers 
receiving provisions from the 
commissaries, and the war board. 
The organization and penalties 
provided by this bill probably 
prevented some theft and 
profiteering, but it left the army 
ill-fed and ill-equipped. 
The financial administration of the 
revolution continued to decline 
until 1780, when Congress basically 
declared itseif bankrupt. That is 
when 1,500 Continental troops 
rebelled for fair pay, because 
inflation had brought four months 
of a soldier's pay to equal the price 
of one bushel of wheat. Congress 
voted to give full monetary authority 
to the financier Robert Morris. He 
took control in 1781 at a time that 
American bills of credit no longer 
had any value, taxes had proven to 
be uncollectible, and the conduct of 
the war was costing $20 million per 
year, almost all of which was paid in 
printing press or fiat money. 
Morris saved a failing situation. By 
administrative cutting, he reduced 
the war expense to $5 million. He 
negotiated new loans from France, 
Spain, and Holland, taking payment 
in silver coins through Cuba and 
Mexico to revive the weak US 
currency. He drew new bills of 
credit against European loans that 
were under negotiation, using his 
own financial prestige and 
reputation to get them accepted, 
and pressuring Ben Franklin in Paris 
to get France to cover them. 
The first American bank was 
founded by Robert Morris in 
Philadelphia to aid the revolutionary 
effort. It took in Continental or state 
paper from the subscribers, who got 
six-month interest-bearing notes on 
the bank. Military supplies were 
bought with this currency. Bills 
drawn on the envoys to Europe 
were held as collateral security until 
Congress paid for the supplies. 
Although these bills were in 
negotiable form, they were not 
negotiated until the envoys abroad 
had actually completed the loans. 
The final American campaign of 
the Revolution at Yorktown, 
Virginia, which defeated the British 
army under Cornwallis and ended 
the war, was financed by a $1.4 
million note Morris issued in his 
own name, plus $20,000 of his own 
funds in silver coins used to provide 
back pay to soldiers. 
Despite his major part in winning 
the Revolution, Robert Morris 
remains a controversial figure in 
American history. Evidence exists 
that he used his position to make 
private profit as a merchant and land 
speculator, and that his wealth 
increased dramatically during the 
war, because of his misuse of power 
and influence. After the Revolution, 
however, huge unsuccessful land 
speculations brought Morris to ruin 
and debtors' prison. 
This entire military effort was, of 
course, under the direction of 
George Washington. A new side of 
his character is revealed by the 
account books he kept, both as a 
military man and as a leading 
businessman of his time. 
As early as 1761, Washington 
shipped 56,000 pounds of tobacco to 
England and stored another 8,300 
pounds of that year's crop. Two 
years later, he organized the 
Mississippi Company to acquire 1 
million acres of western land, 
writing the articles of incorporation 
himself and selling stock to friends. 
The British Crown refused, however, 
to give him a grant. Later 
Washington switched from raising 
tobacco to raising wheat and 
became the largest American miller 
of flour. He also raised prize 
livestock and conducted a major 
fishing business. 
George Washington, like other 
colonial businessmen, kept his own 
accounts throughout his life. He 
devised his own filing system, using 
a letter press, and he filled three 
large ledgers in his own hand. His 
books were ruled like a cash book 
with debits to the left and credits to 
the right. The system was 
presumably based on an accounting 
textbook Washington had in his 
private library, Bookkeeping 
Modernized, or Merchant-Accounts 
by Double Entry according to the 
Italian Form, by John Mair of 
Scotland, published in 1769. 
The profits and net worth in 
Washington's accounts are not easily 
calculated. It appears that he sold 
about $400,000 worth of land 
between 1775 and 1783, but with the 
various forms of depreciated money 
then in circulation, this figure has 
little meaning in terms of the specie 
of that time, or translated into a 
modern currency value. Washington 
apparently was also frustrated by 
being unable to strike a meaningful 
balance, but he made a few 
attempts. In 1769, he achieved some 
type of balance showing: "By cash 
lost, stolen, or paid away without 
charging—£143-15-2." 
He kept exact books on his several 
farms. They covered acres planted 
and harvested and the value of 
crops produced. Even during the 
revolution, he secured continual 
reports from his nephew on the 
progress at Mount Vernon, and sent 
him back instructions and advice. 
The results of his farming were not 
always so impressive; he appears to 
have been able to earn only about 
$15,000 per year from Mount 
Vernon, a plantation then worth 
about $200,000, or a return of 7Vi 
percent untaxed. 
Washington was very conscious of 
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inflation and made notes in his 
accounts, giving approximate values 
of dollars at different times in the 
inflation spiral. He had lost through 
currency depreciation much of the 
fortune that his wife Martha had 
brought him from her first husband. 
In later years, he wrote letters 
cautioning his stepson to protect his 
property against inflation. 
In his military life, George 
Washington also kept careful 
accounts. Congress had offered him 
$500 per month salary in 1775 as 
commander-in-chief of the 
Continental army, but he refused 
any salary and asked only for the 
reimbursement of his expenses. 
The expense account was kept in 
the form of a ledger, using double-
entry, with all expenses dated, 
briefly explained, and stated in both 
the dollar amount spent and in a 
British pounds sterling equivalent 
(listed under "lawful"}. This account 
book traces the entire history of the 
American Revolution as it follows 
Washington's travels and expenses 
from the first skirmish at Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, to the final victory at 
Yorktown, Virginia. 
Washington's expense account is 
interesting not only for its historical 
content, but also for the great care 
and precision shown in the keeping 
of the accounts. The magnitude of 
the accounts is also worthy of note 
because the total expenses came to 
$449,261.51 in today's terms 
(allowing $26 in 1975 currency as 
conservatively equal to one British 
pound sterling in 1780). 
The accounts of Washington— 
along with those of Jefferson, 
Hancock, Franklin, and Morris— 
provide seldom revealed insights 
into the lives of our revolutionary 
leaders. They become normal men 
with problems, rather than the 
monuments that such heroes tend 
to become with the passage of time. 
Through such accounts the 
American Revolution, too, takes on 
a new aspect—not only that of a 
cumulative series of heroic battles, 
but also of an unrelenting struggle 
to finance soldiers, arms, uniforms, 
and rations. 
The life of the average colonial 
businessman or farmer also is 
another area that is given focus 
when considered from an 
accounting aspect. Inflation, 
currency shortages, debts, barter, 
and joint ventures were all recorded 
for posterity in their ledgers and 
journals. 
Perhaps some day historians with 
a knowledge of and interest in 
accounting will unlock new areas of 
study now being overlooked. In the 
meantime, accounting in colonial 
America waits to be discovered. 
When the day comes, will it change 
our understanding of the past? O 
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